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Abstract
CZF is an intuitionistic set theory that does not contain Power Set, substituting instead a weaker
version, Subset Collection. In this paper a Kripke model of CZF is presented in which Power Set
is false. In addition, another Kripke model is presented of CZF with Subset Collection replaced by
Exponentiation, in which Subset Collection fails.
© 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
When making the transition from a classical to an intuitionistic system, one is compelled
to reconsider the axioms chosen. For instance, it would be natural to reformulate those that
imply Excluded Middle. In the context of set theory, typically the Axiom of Foundation
is replaced by the Axiom of Set Induction, the two being equivalent classically but the
latter not yielding Excluded Middle intuitionistically. Even axioms that do not return
classical logic must be re-evaluated, as classically equivalent variants may not remain so
in a different logic. An example of this is Collection, which, over the other ZF axioms, is
equivalent to Replacement and to Reflection, but not over intuitionistic ZF (see [5]).
A different reason for re-evaluating axioms is to take more seriously the program of
constructivism. IZF is basically ZF with classical logic replaced by the intuitionistic form.
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Since, though, the axioms of ZF were never meant to be constructive, they are still not, even
with a different logic. This issue was addressed by Myhill (see [9]), who reformulated the
axioms and framework of ZF to come up with CST (Constructive Set Theory). Among
the changes he made was eliminating the Power Set Axiom as non-constructive; as an
alternative, he included Exponentiation, the hypothesis of the existence of the set of
functions from a set A to a set B, as adequately strong to do most of ordinary mathematics
yet still sufficiently constructive.
Later on, Aczel [1]—see also [2] and [3]—picked up the thread and recast CST in a
more conventional framework, christening this revamped version CZF (Constructive ZF).
He also provided a constructive justification for the enterprise, by interpreting CZF in
Martin-Löf-type theory [7,8]. In so doing, he uncovered a principle apparently stronger
than Exponentiation, Subset Collection. Subset Collection is most easily understood via an
equivalent, Fullness. A set C of total relations from A to B is said to be full if every total
relation from A to B can be thinned to one in C. The Fullness Axiom says that every pair
of sets has a full set of relations. This principle is valid in Aczel’s interpretation, and so is
included in CZF.
This all leads to asking what the exact relationship among these axioms actually is. It is
easily seen that Power Set implies Subset Collection, which itself implies Exponentiation.
What about the reverse implications?
Power Set was not chosen because it is not Martin-Löf interpretable. In more detail,
CZF + Power Set is proof-theoretically stronger than second-order arithmetic (see [11],
prop. 7.12 (ii)), whereas CZF is proof-theoretically equivalent to KP (see [10], theorem
4.14), which is well known to be weaker than second-order arithmetic. (A very different,
type-theoretic way of seeing the independence of Power Set from CZF is provided in [13],
where several interpretations of CZF which falsify Power Set are provided.) In fact,
this distinction carries through over CZF + (Full) Separation, since the latter theory is
proof-theoretically equivalent to second-order arithmetic (see [6]). (CZF contains only
Restricted, or 0, Separation.) Nonetheless, in the next section a model of CZF +
Separation + ¬ Power Set is provided, in part because the previous results are proof-
theoretic rather than model-theoretic, and in part because the model forms the basis of the
construction of the following section.
The situation with Exponentiation is different. Since Rathjen ([10], theorem 4.14)
shows that CZF and CZF − Subset Collection + Exponentiation are proof-theoretically
equivalent, apparently there can be no proof-theoretic argument to show that the former
theory is not implied by the latter. Nonetheless, in Section 3, exactly this is shown model-
theoretically, in that a model is provided of CZF + Separation − Subset Collection in
which Exponentiation is true but Subset Collection false.
By the presence of full Separation in these two models, these results can be construed
as independence results over IZF − Power Set.
In the final section, we observe that a result about Reflection is a by-product of the
earlier work.
For the record, the axioms of IZF are:
• Empty Set: ∃x ∀y y /∈ x
• Pairing: ∀x, y ∃z ∀w w ∈ z ↔ (w = x ∨w = y)
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• Union: ∀x ∃y ∀z(z ∈ y ↔ ∃w(w ∈ x ∧ z ∈ w)
• Extensionality: ∀x, y x = y ↔ ∀z(z ∈ x ↔ z ∈ y)
• Set Induction (Schema): (∀x((∀y ∈ x φ(y))→ φ(x)))→ ∀x φ(x)
• Separation (Schema): ∀x ∃y ∀z z ∈ y ↔ (z ∈ x ∧ φ(z))
• Infinity: ∃x (∃y y ∈ x ∧ ∀y ∈ x ∃z ∈ x y ∈ z)
• Power Set: ∀x ∃y ∀z z ∈ y ↔ ∀q ∈ z q ∈ x
• Collection (Schema): ∀x(∀y ∈ x ∃z φ(y, z)→ ∃w ∀y ∈ x ∃z ∈ w φ(y, z)).
CZF consists of Empty, Pairing, Union, Extensionality, and Set Induction as above.
Separation is replaced by
• 0 Separation (Schema): As above, with φ restricted to be 0.
Infinity is replaced by
• Strong Infinity: ∃x [(∅ ∈ x) ∧ (∀y ∈ x (y ∪ {y}) ∈ x) ∧ ∀z((∅ ∈ z ∧ ∀y ∈ z y ∪ {y} ∈
z)→ x ⊆ z)].
Strong Infinity is a variant of Infinity that more directly producesω without resort to Power
Set or full Separation, which are not present in CZF. Power Set is replaced by Subset
Collection, which, over the other CZF axioms, is equivalent to Fullness, which is a bit
simpler to state and understand.
• Fullness (cf. Subset Collection): ∀x, y ∃z ∀ R (if R is a total relation from x to y then
there is a total relation R′ ∈ z from x to y such that R′ ⊆ R).
Finally, Collection is replaced by
• Strong Collection (Schema): ∀x(∀y ∈ x ∃z φ(y, z)→ ∃w (∀y ∈ x ∃z ∈ w
φ(y, z) ∧ ∀z ∈ w ∃y ∈ x φ(y, z)).
Strong Collection is useful in the absence of full Separation. Collection asserts the
existence of a bounding set (for a total function on a set defined by a formula). In the
presence of Separation, one can take those elements of a postulated bounding set that
come from something in the domain. In CZF, without full Separation available, one cannot
so restrict the bounding set. Strong Collection postulates the existence of a bounding set
containing only range values for elements in the domain.
By way of additional background, recent work on CZF and other intuitionistic set
theories, often involving categorical models, has been done by S. Awodey, C. Butz,
N. Gambino, E. Griffor, A. Joyal, I. Moerdijk, E. Palmgren, A.K. Simpson, Th. Streicher,
and M. Warren. For an excellent overview and references, see [4] or [12].
2. Subset Collection does not imply Power Set
We will provide a Kripke model of CZF + ¬ Power Set (within the meta-theory ZF).
Furthermore, full Separation will hold.
Given a partial order P, the full Kripke model M on P is defined inductively on α ∈
ORD as follows. At node σ , the universe Mασ consists of those functions f with domain
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P≥σ such that for τ ≥ σ f(τ )⊆⋃β<α Mβτ and for ρ ≥ τ fτρ”f(τ )⊆ f(ρ) (where fτρ is the
transition function from node τ to node ρ). fστ is then extended from
⋃
β<α M
β
σ to Mασ as
a restriction: fστ (f) = f  P≥τ . The universe at σ , Mσ , is defined as⋃α∈ORD Mασ . Then ∈
and = are as easy as pie to define: σ |= f ∈ g if f ∈ g(σ ), and σ |= f = g if f = g.
Equivalently, one could simplify the inductive generation of the Kripke sets and the
transition functions, at the expense of ∈ and =, by having the Kripke sets have domain all
of P: Mα = { f : P → ⋃β<α Mβ | f is monotonically non-decreasing (i.e. σ < τ →
f (σ ) ⊆ f (τ ))}. Then Mσ is just⋃α∈ORD Mα (which, note, is independent of σ ), and the
transition functions are just the identity. The complication pops up again when defining
∈ and =, since at σ all nodes not extending σ are unimportant but still in the domains
and hence need to be actively disregarded: σ |= f ∈ g if ∃h ∈ g(σ ) σ |= f = h, and
σ |= f = g if ∀τ ≥ σ [∀h ∈ f (τ ) τ |= h ∈ g(τ ) ∧ ∀h ∈ g(τ ) τ |= h ∈ f (τ )].
The model that we ultimately want to consider differs from that above in that the Kripke
sets are to be, as functions, eventually constant. The formalism developed below will be
to have P be a class. Since every Kripke set is a set, it can give information about only a
set-sized initial segment of P, after which it is assumed to be constant.
At this point it would be prudent, instead of formalizing the ideas above in their full
generality, to particularize to the partial order of interest. So let P be ORD. The nodes in P
will typically be referred to with letters from the middle of the Greek alphabet (κ, λ,µ, ν,
and so on) so as not to cause confusion with the use of α, β, and γ used in inductions.
Both constructions above can be adapted to this choice of P. The adaptation of the
second construction will be described informally, followed by a thorough description using
the first construction, which will remain the basis of this paper. So inductively a Kripke set
is a function from P = ORD to the class of previously defined Kripke sets, which is not
only monotonic but also eventually constant: Mα = { f : ORD → ⋃β<α Mβ | f is
monotonically non-decreasing and ∃κ∀λ > κ f (λ) = f (κ)}. Since f(κ) is set-sized, not
only is each of its elements eventually constant (inductively), but there is a uniform point
of stability: ∃κ∀g ∈ TC( f ) (transitive closure) g is constant beyond κ . The transition
functions, as well as membership and equality, as are above.
To formalize this as stated, an axiomatic theory of classes would be necessary. To work
within a more conventional framework, meaning a theory of sets (the framework of this
paper being, after all, ZF), an element f will have to be a function on a (necessarily) set-
sized initial segment of ORD, beyond which f is implicitly constant. The technical work
here is to define the transition functions fκλ on f, even when λ /∈ dom(f). Since this involves
mucking with the domains anyway, it is easier to adapt the former of the constructions
above. The reader with a clear intuition who is willing to trust that these matters can be
formalized may safely skip to the theorem.
The full Kripke model M on P is defined inductively on α ∈ORD as follows. At node κ ,
the universe Mακ consists of those functions f with domain λ\κ (for some λ > κ) such that
for µ ∈ dom(f) f(µ) ⊆ ⋃β<α Mβµ and for ν ∈ dom(f), ν ≥ µ, fµν” f(µ) ⊆ f(ν) (where
fµν once again is the transition function from node µ to node ν). Without loss of generality
we can also require that for all µ ∈ dom(f) and g ∈ f(µ), dom(f) ⊇ dom(g). (“WLOG”
means here that this additional stipulation does not exclude any sets. More precisely, if
f satisfies the definition for a set in the Kripke structure except for the condition on the
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domain, then there is a Kripke set g satisfying the domain condition such that κ |= “f=g”.
Such a g would be constructed as an end-extension of f, whereby for µ ∈ dom(g)\dom(f),
g(µ) would be taken as fκµ(f), using the transition functions about to be defined.)
fκµ is then extended from
⋃
β<α M
β
κ to Mακ as follows. If µ ∈ dom(f), then fκµ is a
restriction: fκµ(f) = f  dom(f)\µ. If µ /∈ dom(f), then fκµ(f) will have domain {µ} (in
the notation from the last paragraph, λ will be µ + 1), and (fκµ(f))(µ) will be (working
inductively here) ⋃ν∈dom( f ) fνµ” f(ν). It is left to the reader to show that the transition
functions compose as they are supposed to (i.e. fλµ◦ fκλ = fκµ).
The universe at node κ , Mκ , can now be defined as
⋃
α∈ORD Mακ . The transition
functions fκµ defined along the way on Mακ cohered, which is why the dependence on
α was dropped from the notation; the ultimate fκµ defined on Mκ is the union of the partial
fκµ’s defined along the way.
We will need that the model M is definable in V, so we may as well check each building
block in the development of M when it is first introduced. Notice that Mακ cannot be a
function of α, since Mακ is not even a set! However, the relation “f ∈ Mακ ” (as a relation
on f, α, and κ), as well as “fκµ(f) = g” (as a relation on f, g, κ, and µ) is 1. This can
be shown via a simultaneous 1 induction. The central point in this argument is that the
definitions (as given above) contain only bounded quantification and recursive calls.
∈ and = must then be defined via a mutual induction to make sure that Extensionality
holds in the end. The problem here, which does not come up in the case of a set-sized
underlying p.o., is illustrated by the fact that both {〈0,∅〉} and {〈0,∅〉, 〈1,∅〉} stand for the
empty set yet are not themselves equal as sets. The reader uninterested in such details can
safely skip to the main proposition.
Assume that ∈β and=β are defined on Mβκ for all nodes κ and, inductively, for all stages
β < α. For f, g ∈Mακ , κ |= “f ∈α g” iff for some h ∈ g(κ) and β < α, κ |= “f=βh”. Notice
that the sequence of ∈αs is monotonically non-decreasing, that is, if f ∈α g and γ > α
then f ∈γ g. This holds because the defining condition of ∈α remains true if α is increased.
Regarding =, κ |= “f=αg” iff for all λ ∈ dom(f) ∪ dom(g), h ∈ (fκλ(f))(λ), λ |= “h ∈α
fκλ(g)”, and for all h ∈ (fκλ(g))(λ), λ |= “h ∈α fκλ(f)”. Notice that the sequence of =αs
is non-decreasing, because, in the defining condition, α appears only in ∈α , ∈α appears
only positively, and ∈α is already known to be non-decreasing. Furthermore, ∈α and =α
are non-increasing for a fixed collection of sets. That is, using the notation rk f (the rank
of f) for the least ordinal β such that f ∈ Mβκ , and letting α = max(rk f, rk g), κ |= “f ∈α
g” iff for some γ > α κ |= “f ∈γ g”, and similarly for =α. This can be proved by mutual
induction. Finally, let ∈ be⋃β∈ORD ∈β , i.e. κ |= “f ∈ g” iff for some β κ |= “f ∈β g”, and
similarly for =.
Considering definability again, both ∈ and = are 1-definable ternary relations (i.e.
κ |= f ∈ g and κ |= f = g). This is based on two facts. First, for α = max(rk f, rk g),
κ |= “f ∈ g” iff κ |= “f ∈α g”, and similarly for =. Second, ∈α and =α are defined by a
simultaneous recursion which contains only bounded quantification and recursive calls.
Lemma 2.0.1. The transition functions respect the primitive relations ∈ and =.
Proof. It suffices to show that the transition functions respect ∈α and =α . This can be
done by simultaneous induction on α. The case of ∈α is trivial. To show κ |= f=αg implies
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µ |= fκµ(f)=αfκµ(g), if µ ∈ dom(f) ∪ dom(g), then this is trivial, since the only effect
of fκµ is to shrink the set of λ’s that need to be considered. Otherwise one has to unravel
the definition of fκµ, which again brings us to consider those λs in dom(f) ∪ dom(g). The
details are left to the reader. 
Lemma 2.0.2. = (as defined above) satisfies the equality axioms.
Proof. (1) 0 |= ∀x x = x : Assume inductively that for all x ∈ Mβκ (β < α) κ |= x=βx and
that f ∈ Mακ . We need to show that κ |= f=αf, i.e. for all λ ∈ dom(f), h ∈ (fκλ(f))(λ), λ |=
“h ∈α fκλ(f)”. Since λ ∈ dom(f), fκλ operates via restriction, so the condition to be proved
simplifies to for all λ ∈ dom(f), h ∈ f(λ), λ |= “h ∈α fκλ(f)”. Given such a λ and h, by the
definition of ∈α , we need a g ∈ f(λ) and β such that λ |= “h=βg”. Letting g be h and β be
rk(h), the inductive hypothesis gives exactly this.
(2) 0 |= ∀x, y x = y → y = x : Trivial, because the definition of =α was symmetric in
f and g.
(3) 0 |= ∀x, y, z x = y ∧ y = z → x = z: As in (1), the transitivity of =α is proven
inductively on α. The technical difficulty here is that we must consider the domains of
arbitrary Kripke sets f, g, and h, which might all differ. Possibly the easiest way to do this
is to start with the observation that, for arbitrary λ ≥ κ , (fκλ(f))(λ) =⋃µ≤λ,µ∈dom( f ) fµλ”
f(µ). So when evaluating κ |= f=αh, after being led to consider i ∈ (fκλ(f))(λ), we can
conclude that i ∈ fµλ” f(µ) for some µ ∈ dom(f). Using a pre-image iµ of i in f(µ) and
the postulated equality of f and g, one finds a ν ∈ dom(g), ν ≤ µ, a pre-image iν of iµ,
and a jν ∈ g(ν) such that iν =β jν . Then one finds a ξ ≤ ν, jξ ∈ g(ξ ), kξ ∈ h(ξ ) such that
jξ =γ kξ . At this point one uses the monotonicity of = to move up to δ = max(β, γ ), the
inductively assumed transitivity of =δ to get that iξ =δ kξ , and the fact that the transition
functions respect the primitive relations to conclude that λ |= “i ∈α h”. The details are left
to the reader.
(4) 0 |= ∀x, y, z x = y ∧ x ∈ z → y ∈ z: If κ |= “f=g ∧ f ∈ h”, then κ |= “f=i” for
some i ∈ h(κ). By the transitivity of =, κ |= “g=i”.
(5) 0 |= ∀x, y, z x = y ∧ z ∈ x → z ∈ y: If κ |= “f=g ∧ h ∈ f”, then for some i ∈ f(κ)
κ |= “h=i”, and also κ |= “i ∈ g”. That means that for some j ∈ g(κ) κ |= “i=j”. By the
transitivity of =, κ |= “h=j”, and hence also “h ∈ g”. 
With ∈ and = defined, the description of the model M is complete. The definability of
M follows automatically from the work above. Since the universes at each node and the
primitive relations (there being no primitive functions) are definable, the definability of the
satisfaction relation κ |= φ comes directly from the inductive determination of satisfaction
in Kripke models. Furthermore, while we make no claim along the lines of n-satisfaction
being n definable, it is true that 0-satisfaction (i.e. κ |= φ, φ a 0 formula) is 1
definable, as follows. In the inductive definition of satisfaction in Kripke models (when
restricting to 0 formulas), the only times an unbounded quantifier is introduced are for
the clauses ∀ and →, when the collection of nodes is quantified over. Such quantification
can be eliminated by restricting it to the maximum κ of the domains of the parameters,
because the formula is true at κ iff it is true at any later node, this last fact being provable
inductively. (A different proof, which shows the same fact without the restriction of φ being
0, is that there is an isomorphism between the Kripke model from κ on and the model
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from λ on, where λ is any ordinal > κ . This latter argument is given in detail in the proof
of Separation later in this section.)
What remains is to show that M has the desired properties.
Theorem 2.0.3. M |= CZF + ¬ Power Set
As stated in the introduction, the existence of such a model (even if not its construction)
follows from earlier work of Rathjen [10,11], and the existence of such a model
additionally satisfying full Separation follows from a slight extension of Rathjen’s
results [6].
Proof. The simpler axioms of CZF are Empty Set, Pairing, Union, and Strong Infinity, and
the proofs that they hold in M are left to the reader. What we will show are Extensionality,
Set Induction, Restricted Separation, Subset Collection, Strong Collection, and, of course
¬ Power Set. As promised above, we will go beyond CZF and show full Separation.
Extensionality: What needs to be shown is ∀x ∀y (x = y ↔ ∀z (z ∈ x ↔ z ∈ y)).
The implication → follows easily from equality property (5) in the previous proposition.
For the implication ←, given sets f and g and node κ , let α = max(rk f, rk g). The property
that f=αg is precisely, by definition, ∀λ ∈ dom(f) ∪ dom(g), h ∈ (fκλ(f))(λ), λ |= “h
∈α fκλ(g)”, and vice versa. So let h be a member of (fκλ(f))(λ). By assumption, we have
κ |= “∀z (z ∈ f ↔ z ∈ g)”. This holds in particular for h: λ |= “h ∈ (fκλ(f)) ↔ h
∈ (fκλ(g))”. In order to use this, we need that λ |= “h ∈ (fκλ(f))”, when what we have is
merely h ∈ (fκλ(f))(λ). Unraveling the definition of λ |= x ∈β y and making the obvious
choices along the way, this reduces to showing that λ |= h=βh for some β. Letting β
be rk(h), this follows from the proof (albeit not the statement) of the first equality axiom
(previous proposition). Hence we can conclude that λ |= “h ∈ (fκλ(g))”. What we still need
is that λ |= “h ∈α fκλ(g)”. That this is the case was already observed while defining ∈α and
=α. The other direction (“vice versa”) is symmetric in f and g. The details are left to the
reader.
Set Induction: This is easy, because the Kripke sets were defined inductively. That is,
given an appropriate property φ(x), one would show that φ(x) holds for all members of
Mα inductively on α.
Restricted Separation: In fact, full Separation holds. Let κ be a node, a a set in Mκ , and
φ a formula (with free variable x) over (i.e. with parameters from) Mκ . Let λ > κ include
not only dom(a) but also the domains of all of φ’s parameters. For µ > κ we will use
the notation fκµ(φ)(x) to mean φ(x , fκµ(b0), . . . , fκµ(bn−1)), where the bi ’s list all of φ’s
parameters. In V, let Sepa,φ be a function with domain λ + 1\κ such that for all µ in this
domain
Sepa,φ(µ) = {x ∈ (fκµ(a))(µ) | µ |= fκµ(φ)(x)}.
This function Sepa,φ is definable in V because M is, and it should be clear that for all µ ∈
dom(Sepa,φ), x ∈ Mµ,
µ |= “x ∈ fκµ(Sepa,φ)↔ x ∈ fκµ(a)∧ fκµ(φ)(x)”.
We need only show why the same holds also for µ > λ. The idea is that beyond λ nothing
relevant (i.e. a or φ) is changing any longer, and so Sepa,φ need not change either. In
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detail, for any such µ, by the choice of λ, fλµ is an isomorphism on fκλ(a), fκλ(φ), and
fκλ(Sepa,φ), the nature of which is replacing the domains in the transitive closures of the
sets in question, which are all {λ}, with {µ}. This isomorphism can be extended to one
between Mλ and Mµ by hereditarily replacing ordinals in the domains, necessarily of the
form λ+ξ , withµ+ξ . Under this isomorphism, {x ∈ Mλ | λ |= “x ∈ fκλ(a)∧fκλ(φ)(x)”},
i.e. Sepa,φ(λ), gets mapped to {x ∈ Mµ | µ |= “x ∈ fλµ(fκλ(a)) ∧ fλµ(fκλ(φ))(x)”}. By
the composition property of transition functions (fστ◦ fρσ = fρτ , a necessary condition on
all Kripke models), we have the desired result.
Subset Collection: Let κ ∈ ORD, a, b ∈ Mκ . Let λ ⊇ dom(a), dom(b). SubColla,b will
have domain λ+ 1\κ . For all µ in this domain, let
SubColla,b(µ) = {x ∈ Mµ | µ |= “x is a total relation from a to b”}.
It is immediate that for all µ ∈ dom(SubColla,b), x ∈ Mµ,
µ |= “x ∈ fκµ(SubColla,b)↔ x is a total relation from a to b”.
For µ > λ, the idea is that from λ to µ neither a nor b has changed. So if node µ forces
x to be a total relation from a to b, then any ordered pairs that might enter x at a later
node can be disregarded and x would still remain total, since a does not grow any more.
Furthermore, the ordered pairs at node µ can be “pulled back” to node λ, since neither a
nor b grew from λ to µ. This (possibly truncated) version of x was put into SubColla,b by
at latest node λ, and is indeed a total subrelation of x .
In more detail, observe that for any such µ, by the choice of λ, fλµ is an isomorphism
on fκλ(a) and fκλ(b). Let µ |= “x is a total relation from fκµ(a) to fκµ(b)”. Then x(µ) is
a total relation from (fκµ(a))(µ) to (fκµ(b))(µ). This induces via the isomorphism a total
relation from (fκλ(a))(λ) to (fκλ(b))(λ); let z be the function with domain {λ} and z(λ)
being this relation. λ |= “z is total” since a does not change beyond λ, so λ |= “z ∈
SubColla,b”. By the construction of z, µ |= fλµ(z) ⊆ x .
Strong Collection: Let κ be a node, a a set in Mκ , and φ a formula (with free variable
x) over (i.e. with parameters from) Mκ , such that κ |= “∀x ∈ a ∃y φ(x, y)”. Let λ > κ
include not only dom(a) but also the domains of all of φ’s parameters. As above, the
notation fκµ(φ)(x) means φ(x , fκµ(b0), . . . , fκµ(bn−1)), where the bi ’s list all of φ’s
parameters. In V, a function StrColla,φ with domain λ + 1\κ can be constructed such
that for all µ and ν in this domain with µ < ν,
∀x ∈ a(µ) ∃y ∈ StrColla,φ(µ) µ |= φ(x, y),
∀y ∈ StrColla,φ(µ) ∃x ∈ a(µ) µ |= φ(x, y),
and fµν” StrColla,φ(µ) ⊆ StrColla,φ(ν). StrColla,φ clearly acts as a bounding set at all
nodes through λ. Beyond λ the idea is that nothing relevant (i.e. a or φ) is changing any
longer, and so StrColla,φ need not change either. The argument is essentially the same as
that for Restricted Separation, and is left to the reader.
¬ Power Set: For κ ∈ ORD, let 1κ be the Kripke set with domain κ + 1 such that for
λ < κ 1κ(λ) = ∅ and 1κ(κ) = 〈κ,∅〉. 0 |= “1κ ⊆ 1 =def {0}”, but by the set-sized
nature of the members of M, no set contains all of the 1κ ’s. Therefore 1 has no power set
in M. 
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3. Exponentiation does not imply Subset Collection
We will provide a Kripke model of CZF − Subset Collection + Exponentiation +
¬ Subset Collection. Furthermore, full Separation will hold.
The model to be built in this section is an extension of that from the previous section,
and ultimately can be defined only in a generic extension V[G] of V. A simpler description
of the model, as suggested by Alex Simpson, which enables a much simpler verification of
the axioms, is presented in the section after this. The more complicated description is still
being given because, as an alternative representation of the model, it provides different
information about the model, and the proof techniques that it forces are of independent
interest. It is being presented first because it was discovered first. A reader comfortable
with Kripke models and forcing needs from this section only the description of the generic
G and then could skip to the next.
The sets in this new model, although not (all of them) members of V but of rather V[G],
will be named by terms in V and so we will work in V at first to identify the terms. When
the terms are interpreted, they will be functions just as in the last section, and so their
domains will also be given during their inductive generation.
The terms at node κ , defined inductively on the ordinals, are:
• f0κ(Gλ), where
– λ is an ordinal,
– the domain is [κ, max(κ, λ)],
– typically these will be referred to more simply as Gλ,
– (of course, in this context the symbol “f0κ” is just a piece of syntax. It should,
however, remind you of the transition function from node 0 to κ . In an attempt to
reduce notation, we will use the same notation for a term as for its interpretation,
hence the double meaning of “f0κ”.)
• Union(a), where
– a is a term at node κ ,
– the domain is the same as that of a,
• Sepa,φ,λ, where
– a is a term at node κ ,
– φ is a 0 formula (in which all of the parameters are terms at node κ),
– λ > κ ,
– if Gµ appears anywhere in a or φ, then λ > µ (for the use of this clause, see the
proof of ¬ Subset Collection),
– the domain is [κ, λ), and
• any function built via the inductive construction of the previous section (given in
page 212), where
– the domain is explicitly given.
Concerning the interpretation of these terms, we introduce some notation. For an
integer n and node κ , nMκ is the internal version of n; that is, 0Mκ = 〈κ,∅〉 and n+1Mκ =
〈κ, nMκ ∪ {nMκ }〉. Let NMκ be {nMκ | n ∈ N}. (Notice that NMκ is not actually a set in M; if we
had instead wanted to define the internal version of the natural numbers, say, that would be
〈κ,NMκ 〉 (or a variant thereof).)
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Let G be a generic relation on N. That is, G is generic over V for the forcing partial
order which consists of functions from finite subsets of N × N to 2; p extends q (written
“p ≤ q”) if p extends q as a function, i.e. p ⊇ q. A generic can be identified with a total
function F : N × N → 2; letting G be { 〈m, n〉 | F(〈m, n〉) = 1 }, G is then a generic
relation on N. Notice that by genericity, both G and G−1 are total.
In V[G], let GMκ be { 〈mMκ , nMκ 〉M | 〈m, n〉 ∈ G } (where 〈 , 〉M means the M-internal
ordered pair function). Similarly, let (N × N)Mκ be { 〈mMκ , nMκ 〉M | m, n ∈ NMκ }.
Using the GMκ s, we can now provide an interpretation for the terms. (Remember, we are
using the same notation for the interpretation of a term as for the term itself; whether a term
or its interpretation is meant should be clear from the context.) For f0κ(Gλ), f0κ(Gλ)(µ)
= GMµ for µ < λ (the internal version of G), and f0κ(Gλ)(µ) = (N × N)Mκ otherwise (the
full relation on N). Union(a)(κ) (where κ ∈ dom(a)) is ⋃ f ∈a(κ) f (κ). The interpretation
of Sepa,φ,λ is similar to that of Sepa,φ in the previous section (see the proof of Restricted
Separation), only there an essentially arbitrary λ was chosen (the only requirement being
that λ be big enough), whereas here the λ in question is a part of the term and the size
restriction is dropped. So for µ ∈ [κ, λ),
Sepa,φ,λ(µ) = {x ∈ ( fκµ(a))(µ) | µ |= fκµ(φ)(x)}.
The interpretation of a function is straightforward: mod the above-mentioned identification
of terms with their interpretations, there is literally nothing to do.
Of course, to have a Kripke model, we need some other facts and definitions; indeed,
the interpretation above is dependent upon some of these, which would therefore need to
be proven and defined simultaneously with this inductive interpretation. That is, we need
to define transition functions fκµ, show that they cohere (i.e. fλµ◦ fκλ = fκµ), and show
that the Kripke sets are non-decreasing (i.e. if κ |= a ∈ b then µ |=fκµ(a) ∈ fκµ(b)). We
will leave the details to the reader, and content ourselves with one observation. Since λ was
pointedly left out of the domain of Sepa,φ,λ, for all µ ≥ λ including λ itself
Sepa,φ,λ(µ) =
⋃
ν∈[κ,λ)
fνµ” Sepa,φ,λ(ν).
Notice that M (i.e. κ |= φ) is definable in V[G]. In particular, as in the previous section,
0-satisfaction is 1. Furthermore, since G is set-generic over V, by general forcing
technology, p  “κ |= φ” is definable in V, and, in particular, p  “κ |= φ”, where φ
is 0, is 1.
Theorem 3.0.4. M |= CZF − Subset Collection + Exponentiation+ ¬ Subset Collection
Proof. Extensionality, Set Induction, and Strong Infinity are left to the reader.
Union: This follows from the presence (and meaning) of the terms of the form Union(a).
Pairing: Given a, b ∈ Mκ , let λ include dom(a) and dom(b). For µ ∈ λ\κ let f(µ) be
{fκµ(a), fκµ(b)}, which suffices. Notice that f is definable even if a or b is just a term, so
f exists at least as a term in V (even if inductively uninterpretable in V).
Restricted Separation: This follows from the presence (and meaning) of the terms of the
form Sepa,φ,λ, with the proof being essentially that in the previous section. The one change
is that the isomorphism given there must be extended to account for terms of the form Gκ
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(the other terms already being accounted for inductively). Under this isomorphism, Gλ+ξ
is to be sent to Gµ+ξ .
In fact, full Separation holds, even though the separation terms are only for0 formulas.
The first guess as to how to proceed is as follows. Given a and φ a term and formula in
(resp. over) Mκ , let λ > κ include the domains of a and of φ’s parameters. Let µ > λ be
such that Vµ[G] contains a, φ’s parameters, and is a n elementary substructure of V[G]
for n sufficiently large (i.e. large enough to reflect the truth of φ(x) in M). Let f be the
function with domain µ\κ such that f(ν) = { g ∈ Vµ | g is a term naming an element of
Mν }. The notation “φ f ” means “φ with all of the unbounded variables bounded by f”.
By the choice of µ, φ(x) is interpreted in M (in V[G]) just as φ(x) would be in Vµ[G]’s
version of M. If in turn that could be captured as Sepa,φ f ,µ (in V[G]), then we would be
done.
The problem is that, while f reflects the restriction to Mµ, it cannot reflect the restriction
of P from ORD to µ. To give a concrete example, let φ be the sentence “∀x ∀y x = y∨x  =
y”. In M, this sentence is never true, and so any separation set for φ should be the empty
set. However, for any choice of f, φ f eventually becomes true (at the latest beyond f’s
domain), so Sepa,φ f ,µ eventually becomes a.
We need some way of saying “do not look beyond this node”. This can be done with
a technique developed in its essence by Friedman and Scedrov. In [5], they consider a
particular formula ψ (in the notation to be introduced) and a particular Kripke model;
moreover, their model was a two-node model, so their Mpre−ψ (see below) was a classical
and not even a Kripke structure. Nonetheless, their work is easily generalized to all
formulas and all models. To have this generalization shown, and to keep this paper self-
contained, we develop the details.
Let ψ be a sentence, possibly with parameters from the universe at the bottom node
⊥ in some Kripke model M. Using ψ , a transformation on the formulas can be defined
inductively. If φ is atomic (including ⊥, the always false statement), then φ∗ is φ ∨ ψ .
The inductive clauses are transparent to this construction: (φ0 → φ1)∗ = (φ∗0 →
φ∗1 ),∀x φ(x) = ∀x φ∗(x), etc. It is easy to see inductively on φ that for all formulas
φ and all nodes σ with σ |= ψ, σ |= φ∗. Let Mpre−ψ be M with all the nodes where ψ
holds thrown out. That is, Mpre−ψ ’s underlying partial order is the initial sub-order of M’s
P consisting of {σ |σ  |= ψ} =def Ppre−ψ (which is assumed to be non-empty, i.e. ⊥  |= ψ).
The universe of Mpre−ψ at σ is the same as for M, the transition functions are the same,
the atomic relations and functions have the same interpretation. Because nodes in Mpre−ψ
are also nodes in M, we will distinguish notationally truth in Mpre−ψ from truth in M with
|=Mpre−ψ versus |=M.
Lemma 3.0.5. σ |=M φ∗ iff σ |=Mpre−ψ φ.
Proof. By induction on φ.
• φ atomic: σ |=M φ∗ iff σ |=M φ ∨ ψ . Since by hypothesis σ  |=M ψ , this is equivalent
to σ |=M φ, which is itself equivalent to σ |=Mpre−ψ φ, since Mpre−ψ is a restriction of
M and the atomic relations are defined locally. (Although this lemma is very general,
the reader can be excused for thinking of models of set theory, and ask whether equality
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as defined by “same members” really holds. Note we do not claim that Extensionality
is preserved! The equality in M is taken as primitive.)
• φ0 ∨ φ1: σ |=M φ∗0 ∨ φ∗1 iff
σ |=M φ∗0 or σ |=M φ∗1 iff (inductively)
σ |=Mpre−ψ φ0 or σ |=Mpre−ψ φ1 iff
σ |=Mpre−ψ φ0 ∨ φ1.
• φ0 ∧ φ1: Analogous to ∨.
• φ0 → φ1: It has already been observed that:
for τ ∈ P\Ppre−ψτ |=M φ∗0 ∧ φ∗1 .
So for σ ∈ Ppre−ψ , σ |=M φ∗0 → φ∗1 reduces to:
for all extensions τ ∈ Ppre−ψ of σ , if τ |=M φ∗0 then τ |=M φ∗1 .
Inductively, this is equivalent to:
for all extensions τ ∈ Ppre−ψ of σ , if τ |=Mpre−ψ φ0 then τ |=Mpre−ψ φ1, i.e.
σ |=Mpre−ψ φ0 → φ1.
• ∀x φ(x): It has already been observed that:
for τ ∈ P\Ppre−ψ and x ∈ Mτ , τ |=M φ∗(x).
So for σ ∈ Ppre−ψ , σ |=M ∀x φ∗(x) reduces to:
for all extensions τ ∈ Ppre−ψ of σ and x ∈ Mτ , τ |=M φ∗(x).
Inductively, this is equivalent to:
for all extensions τ ∈ Ppre−ψ of σ , and x ∈ Mτ , τ |=Mpre−ψ φ(x),
i.e. σ |=Mpre−ψ ∀x φ(x).
• ∃x φ(x): σ |=M ∃x φ∗(x) iff
for some x ∈ Mσ σ |=M φ∗(x) iff (inductively)
for some x ∈ Mσ σ |=Mpre−ψ φ(x) iff
σ |=Mpre−ψ ∃x φ(x). 
To return to the issue at hand, let ψ be the sentence “0 ∈ 1µ”, where µ is as above.
(Recall that 1µ is defined so that ψ is true exactly at nodes µ and beyond.) This choice of
ψ determines a *-transformation on formulas. Then Sepa,φ f ∗,µ (equivalently, Sepa,φ∗ f ,µ)
is as desired. That is, we claim that
κ |= ∀x (x ∈ Sepa,φ∗ f ,µ ↔ (x ∈ a ∧ φ(x))).
Observe before we begin that Sepa,φ f ∗,µ is a well-defined piece of syntax, since µ is larger
than any λ occurring in any Gλ in a and φ f ∗. (In what follows, we suppress mention of the
transition functions fκλ, for purposes of readability, preferring instead to write the incorrect
“λ |= x ∈ a” rather than “λ |= x ∈ fκλ(a)”, to give only a mild example of what the reader
would otherwise be in for.)
First suppose that κ ≤ λ < µ and x ∈ Mλ. If x /∈ Mµ then x gets into neither a nor
Sepa,φ∗ f ,µ, and we are done. Otherwise, by the choice of µ,
λ |= “x ∈ a ∧ φ(x)” iff Vµ[G] |= “λ |= “x ∈ a ∧ φ(x)” ”.
The difference between M (in V[G]) and Vµ[G]’s version thereof is the partial order
(ORD versus µ) and the ordinal length of the inductive generation of terms (again, ORD
R.S. Lubarsky / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 132 (2005) 209–225 221
versus µ). The former is captured by ψ , the latter by f; notationally, M as interpreted in
Vµ[G] is Mµpre−ψ . So
Vµ[G] |= “λ |= “x ∈ a ∧ φ(x)” ” iff λ |=Mpre−ψ “x ∈ a ∧ φ f (x)”.
By the previous lemma, the latter is equivalent to λ |= “x ∈ a ∧ φ f ∗(x)”. By the
interpretation of Sep-terms, the latter is equivalent to λ |= “x ∈ Sepa,φ f ∗,µ”.
Now consider the case λ ≥ µ, x ∈ Mλ. Since λ ≥ µ > dom(a), if λ |= “x ∈ a”
then there are ν < µ and y ∈ Mν such that x = fνµ(y) and ν |= “y ∈ a”. Without loss
of generality ν can be chosen to be larger than the domains of a and φ’s parameters. For
any such ν and y, by the same isomorphism argument as in the last section, ν |= φ(y) iff
λ |= φ(x). Furthermore, since a ∈ Vµ[G] (by the choice of µ), y is not only in Mν but also
Mµν . Combining all of this with the definition of fκλ(Sepa,φ f ∗,µ) (which was highlighted
just before the statement of the current theorem), we get the following equivalences:
λ |= “x ∈ a ∧ φ(x)” ←→
∃ν < µ, y ∈ Mµν (x = fνλ(y) ∧ ν |= “y ∈ a ∧ φ(y)”)←→
(by the case above: κ ≤ λ < µ, with ν here playing the role of λ)
∃ν < µ, y ∈ Mµν (x = fνλ(y) ∧ ν |= “y ∈ Sepa,φ f ∗,µ”)←→
∃ν < µ, y ∈ Mν (x = fνλ(y) ∧ ν |= “y ∈ Sepa,φ f ∗,µ”)←→
λ |= “x ∈ Sepa,φ f ∗,µ”.
Strong Collection: In the presence of full Separation (see the last paragraph), Strong
Collection follows from Collection. Suppose κ |= ∀x ∈ a ∃y φ(x, y). Let λ,µ and f be as
in the last paragraph. Then κ |= “f is a bounding set for φ on a”.
Exponentiation: In order to highlight exactly why the following argument works for
functions (yielding Exponentiation) but not for arbitrary relations (hence not yielding
Subset Collection), it will be presented in terms of a relation R until exactly that moment
when we need to use that R is not only a relation but also a function.
So let a and b be terms for sets in Mκ , and p a forcing condition, R a term, and λ ≥ κ an
ordinal so that p  “λ |= R is a relation from a to b”. Since the property of being a relation
between two given sets is 0, the assertion p  “λ |= R is a relation from a to b” is 1 in
V. We will use later the same result for the property of R being a function from a to b.
Let H be the 1-Skolem hull of {a, b, κ , λ, R} ∪ TC(a) ∪ TC(b) ∪ κ , of the same
size as that set (where “TC” stands for transitive closure). Let ρ be the transitive collapsing
function. Then
ρ” H |= “ρ(p)  “ρ(λ) |= ρ(R) is a relation from ρ(a) to ρ(b)” ”.
ρ fixes p, a, and b because Lω, TC(a), and TC(b) ⊆ H. Furthermore, ρ(λ) ≤ λ, so for
some µ ≤ λ
ρ” H |= “p  “µ |= ρ(R) is a relation from a to b” ”,
and, by the same reasoning, for all q ≥ p,
H |= “q  “λ |= 〈xa, yb〉 ∈ R” ” iff ρ” H |= “q  “µ |= 〈xa, yb〉 ∈ ρ(R)” ”.
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However, the assertion “q  “µ |= 〈xa, yb〉 ∈ ρ(R)” ” is 1 over both V and ρ”H (as
the collapse of a 1 substructure of V), and hence is absolute (between ρ”H and V), as is
“q  “λ |= 〈xa, yb〉 ∈ R” ” between H and V. Therefore
q  “λ |= 〈xa, yb〉 ∈ R” iff q  “µ |= 〈xa, yb〉 ∈ ρ(R)”.
Since µ ≤ λ,
if q  “µ |= 〈xa, yb〉 ∈ ρ(R)” then q  “λ |= 〈xa, yb〉 ∈ ρ(R)”.
Combining the last two assertions,
if q  “λ |= 〈xa, yb〉 ∈ R” then q  “λ |= 〈xa, yb〉 ∈ ρ(R)”,
i.e. p  “λ |= R ⊆ ρ(R)”.
Under the assumption merely that R is a relation, no more can be said. If, however, p
 “λ |= R is a (total) function (from a to b)”, then, by analogous arguments to those above,
H |= “p  “λ |= R is a function” ”,
ρ(H) |= “p  “µ |= ρ(R) is a function” ”,
p  “µ |= ρ(R) is a function”, and
p  “λ |= ρ(R)is a function”.
Since a (total) function cannot be properly extended to a function, p  “R = ρ(R)”.
By the cardinality constraint on H, there is an ordinal α (independent of λ and R) such
that ρ”H ⊆ Vα . In particular, ρ(R) ∈ Vα. Let g be the function with domain α\κ such that
g(ν) = { h ∈ Vα | h is a term naming an element of Mν }. Then g is a bounding set for ab.
By Separation (Restricted Separation suffices here), ab is a set.
¬ Subset Collection: Suppose that κ |= “for all total relations R on N there is a total
subrelation R′, R′ ∈ F”. There is an ordinal λ such that, for all terms Gµ in the transitive
closure of F, µ < λ; without loss of generality, λ > κ . Since for every such µ λ |= Gµ = N
× N, fκλ(F) can be evaluated in V. (This is exactly the point where we use the restriction
on the ordinal in the separation terms as being larger than µ for any Gµ appearing in the
term. Past any such subscripted ordinal, the associated separation term does not grow any
more, but by that point Gµ has already become N × N.) By assumption, λ |= “there is a
total subrelation of Gλ in fκλ(F)”. This is, however, impossible, by the genericity of G, as
follows. Let λ |= “R′ ∈ fκλ(F)”. In V, R′(λ) can be identified with a total relation on N (and
so we will use the same notation R′(λ) for this relation in V). Let p be a forcing condition.
Since p is finite and R′(λ) total, let 〈m, n〉 ∈ R′(λ) be such that 〈m, n〉  ∈ dom(p), and let q
be p ∪〈〈m, n〉, 0〉. q  “R′(λ) is not a subrelation of G”, so q  “λ  |= “R′ is a subrelation
of Gλ” ”. Hence the set of conditions forcing λ  |= “R′ is a subrelation of Gλ” is dense, and
so in V[G] λ  |= “R′ is a subrelation of Gλ”. This however contradicts the construction of λ,
so the assumption on κ is false, and Subset Collection fails for relations on N. 
4. An alternative description of the model
Alex Simpson asked whether the proof in the last section could be simplified by
providing a unified, less syntactic criterion for membership in a possibly different model M
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still satisfying the same axioms. He suggested considering all those Kripke sets in V[G]
that eventually settle down to something in V. In fact, this does even more: this property
characterizes exactly those sets in the same model M from the previous section.
Indeed, with this description of M, the verification of the axioms becomes significantly
easier. Consider the example of Separation, the verification of which took over half of the
previous proof. All that needs to be shown is that the unique choice of separation set (given
a and φ) eventually settles down to something in V. This will happen by the time a and
all of φ’s parameters settle down, say by node κ . To see this, suppose that (in M, itself in
V[G]),
κ |= “b ∈ a ∧ φ(b)”.
That fact would have to be forced (in V now) by some condition p in G:
p  “κ |= “b ∈ a ∧ φ(b)” ”.
Using standard forcing technology, given any other condition q, there is an automorphism
σ of the forcing p.o. such that σ (p) and q are compatible, and
(σ (p) ∧ q)  “σ(κ) |= “σ(b) ∈ σ(a) ∧ σ(φ(b))” ”.
However, the sentence being forced refers only to elements in V, and so is unchanged under
σ :
(σ (p) ∧ q)  “κ |= “b ∈ a ∧ φ(b)” ”.
So the set of conditions forcing “κ |= “b ∈ a ∧ φ(b)” ” is dense, and hence
#  “κ |= “b ∈ a ∧ φ(b)” ”.
Hence if any member of a is ever forced into the separation set, it is so forced by #. That
means that the separation set does settle down to something in V, namely to those elements
of a forced by # to satisfy φ.
The demonstration of the other axioms is left as an exercise.
It remains to see that this alternative characterization does indeed determine the same
M. Clearly every set in M settles down to something in V; just go to a node at which all
of the Gλ’s mentioned have become N × N. (This fact was already used, in the proof of
¬ Subset Collection.) In the other direction, suppose a Kripke set x (WLOG at node 0) in
V[G] settles down to something in V. We can assume inductively that x is a subset of M.
We will describe x as a certain separation term.
Let t be the ground model set that x settles down to, κ some node before which that
happens, and p a condition in G forcing as much. Note that even though κ |= x = t , and
Kripke sets can only grow, that does not mean that 0 |= x ⊆ t : x may merely contain
elements that grow into elements of t . So we cannot use t as the bounding set a in the
separation term. Still, we can find a different Kripke set a such that 0 |= x ⊆ a: in V[G], x
is (essentially) a function with domain κ and each x(λ) is (inductively) a set of terms from
V, everything being bounded by a certain ordinal rank; in V, one can take a function a with
domain κ such that a(λ) consists of every term bounded by that same ordinal rank forced
by any condition below p to be in x(λ). (The ordinal bound is necessary because there can
be class-many terms all naming the same set.)
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Now we need to develop the formula φ which determines when something from a gets
into x . This happens exactly when forced to by forcing conditions in the generic G. Take
the diagram of such. That is, let D(λ) (λ < κ) consist of pairs 〈q, y〉, where q extends p (see
above for p), y ∈ a(λ), and q  “λ |= “y ∈ x” ”. We would like to use D in the defining
formula for x . The problem is that to interpret D you need G, which pointedly M does not
have. But M does have enough of G. Part of this is in the form of Gκ . After all, after κ x
is merely t , and so G is no longer needed. The other part is the negative information about
G. Keeping in mind that forcing conditions not only put (pairs of) integers into G but also
keep them out, observe that Gκ does not explicitly contain this negative information: if n
∈ G, then λ |= n ∈ Gκ , but if n /∈ G it is false that λ |= n /∈ Gκ ; in fact, λ |= ¬n /∈ Gκ .
What we need is the κ-pseudocomplement. Recall that in a Heyting algebra, b is the
pseudocomplement of a if a ∩ b = 0 and a ∪ b is as big as possible. Extending this
to subsets of N × N, the pseudocomplement of Gκ would be the empty set, since Gκ
eventually becomes N × N. So instead, let G¯κ , G’s κ-pseudocomplement be (as defined in
M at node 0) {n ∈ N × N | n ∈ Gκ → Gκ = N × N}. Then G¯κ (λ) = G¯ if λ < κ , N × N
otherwise.
Now D can be rewritten, with 〈q, y〉 replaced by 〈q1, q0, y〉, q1 the positive parts of q,
q0 the negative. The controlling formula in the separation term φ(y) will be “∃q1, q0 such
that 〈q1, q0, y〉 ∈ D, q1 ⊆ Gκ , q0 ⊆ G¯κ”. To complete the description of a separation
term, a subscripting ordinal is needed. In the case at hand, it will play no role; for the sake
of definiteness, let κ + 1 be such. We claim that 0 |= “x = Sepa,φ,κ+1”.
Up to node κ , φ puts into Sepa,φ,κ+1 exactly those y’s forced into x . At κ itself, though,
there is something to be done, since everything forced into x by any q ≤ p, even those q
not in G, would be put into Sepa,φ,κ+1 by this definition. In this case, q  “κ |= y ∈ x”;
since q ≤ p  “κ |= x = t”, q  “κ |= y ∈ t”. Since y has settled down by κ , this last fact
can actually be evaluated in V, independently of G: #  “κ |= y ∈ t”. By the choice of p,
p  “κ |= y ∈ x”. So p  “κ |= Sepa,φ,κ+1 ⊆ x”. For the inclusion in the other direction,
by the choice of κ , x settled down to t before κ . So anything in x at node κ actually got
into x at some λ < κ , at which point it would have got into Sepa,φ,κ+1.
Although the proof just sketched is complete, the reader could be excused for wondering
where the λ in Sepa,φ,λ went to. After all, this λ played a crucial role in the proof of
Separation in the previous section, and to be convinced that the current description of M
really is the same as the first one, one might like to know where the λ went. Recall that
λ’s role had been to control an otherwise wild growth of the separation term. Here, that
function is being served by t , arguably the pair p and t together.
5. Reflection
Although this article is about Power Set and its variants, a result about Collection and
its variants is right there, and so should be pointed out. Classically, over the other axioms
of ZF, Reflection, Collection, and Replacement are equivalent. The proofs that Reflection
implies Collection, which in turn implies Replacement, are soft and easy proofs, and so
carry over verbatim to intuitionistic logic. The reverse implications are less obvious and
make essential use of classical logic; the standard proofs do not carry over. In fact, it
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was shown in [5] that Replacement does not imply Collection over the remaining axioms
of IZF. It is natural to ask whether the same can be said of Collection and Reflection.
Although this is still unknown, the first construction of this paper provides a model of CZF
+ Separation + ¬ Reflection. The only axiom that is missing from IZF is Power Set, and
Subset Collection is at least a partial substitute.
Moreover, the failure of Reflection is very strong. All true 1 facts are reflected in any
transitive set, and any true 1 sentence is reflected in any transitive set that contains a
witness. In contrast, consider ¬∀x ∀y (x = y ∨ x  = y). This is true in the whole model,
and false in every set.
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